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THE LONG WAR AND AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MILITARY
People are going about their daily lives, working and shopping and playing, worshiping at churches and synagogues and mosques, going to movies and to baseball games…..that is the ultimate repudiation of terrorism.
-George W. Bush First, I will review the relevant literature from the vast body of civil-military relations theory to lay out the aspects of society from which the military can judge its level of integration. I will then describe the factors that make the struggle against terrorism unique, and in doing so, will discuss the potential each factor has to close, create or widen a gap between the military and society. Finally, I will discuss whether that gap is a cause for concern in this struggle, focusing on the effective formulation and execution of strategy and concluding with recommendations for managing the gap.
There are many factors at play today that affect the current and future state of the civil-military relationship, and in fact much has been written on the interaction of the military leadership with civilian authorities in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 2 However, this essay will go beyond the war in Iraq and examine only those factors unique to the "long war."
Definitions
This field is fraught with debate over definition and the rhetoric is indeed important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assert definitional correctness.
Instead, I will define the terms critical to understanding my argument in a way that represents a common view.
Civil-Military Relationship. While the term can be defined many ways, this paper will examine the relationship between the military and the civilian society it serves. Terrorism. There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism despite repeated attempts by the United Nations to develop one. 4 However, the "consensus definition" of terrorism was developed in the early 1980s and probably accepted by about 75% of the experts in the field. 5 Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims become targets of violence. Through the previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of a group are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). The victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers, which in turn creates an audience beyond the target of terror. The purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demand or targets of attention." 6 Global War on Terrorism. This paper will attempt to avoid the term "GWOT."
Where it is cited, quoted or otherwise used, it is done so as the expressed title of a United States' campaign and otherwise means the struggle against violent extremism in which the United States is currently engaged. In fact, the "struggle against violent extremism" was proposed as an alternative to the lighting rod term, "Global War on Terrorism" in July 2005. 7 The main opposition to the use of "GWOT" is that it implies a military action against an ill-defined method, thereby inferring that the military instrument is the most appropriate among many other instruments of national power, and that we are combating a means instead of the threat itself.
Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the GWOT. Regardless of whether one believes that Operation Iraqi Freedom was prompted by a rational and strategic approach to countering global terrorism or rather, served only to exacerbate the problem, there is little disagreement that the repercussions of victory or defeat will significantly affect the struggle against violent extremism. Therefore, it is included as one phase or chapter of the American-defined larger campaign that is likely to shape public opinion about the military for years to come.
Civil-Military Relations Theory
Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are considered the founders of the field and have at the core of their theoretical work the basic paradox of the civil-military relationship: the institution created to apply violence against enemies of the state can threaten the state it was created to protect. It therefore follows that, "in a democracy, those who govern have power by the virtue of a popular vote of their country's citizens.
While not similarly elected, the military also holds power. Consequently, effective civilmilitary relations…are vital to those seeking to create a government that is ultimately responsible to the people who elected it." 8 In the case of the United States, equating inappropriate civil-military relations to a coup is outside the scope of responsible analysis. Therefore, "control" of the military is perhaps not the most useful way to frame discussion of civil-military relations. A better analytical touchstone is "effectiveness." Sub-optimal civil-military relations demonstrated by a reluctance of the military to provide military options, budget requests that reflect a preferred capability and a myriad other acts of lesser-than-coup commission and omission can result in bad policy, and/or ineffective execution. 9 Poor informational inputs can contribute to poor policy decisions and national treasure of all types can be wasted when policy and operations are not integrated; this is the heart of the civil-military debate in America.
To start with a brief explanation of Samuel Huntington's theory is appropriate as all other theories of civil-military relations draw on one or more aspects of his work. His causal logic goes as follows: the liberal ideology of the American society in conjunction with the external security environment drive the elected body to offer the military an autonomous sphere (objective control). The autonomous sphere is maintained through the professionalism of the officer corps and therefore, the civilian entity and the military entity are distinct from each other. 10 This separateness is a good thing, but in the long run, American anti-military, liberal society must adopt some of the military's conservative realism if military effectiveness is to be achieved.
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Morris Janowitz' work, while based on Huntington's concept of professionalism, offers an alternative approach. He found a way around Huntington's problem of a conservative military in a liberal society, writing that the military can also be controlled not just by professionalism but by effective integration into society. He and his followers of a sociological approach to civil-military relations did not believe in the distinctness of the military from society and its civilian authority figures. The officer corps was becoming increasingly pragmatic and less absolute-warrior in the character of its professionalism, driven by a need for the politically savvy officer to recognize the strategic and tactical dimensions of a full spectrum of military operations. He believed that the political system was geared toward an active role for the military in policymaking. 12 On the societal level, Janowitz said about the soldier:
He is amenable to civilian control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force. He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its values. 13 Neither theory has been consistently upheld by empirical evidence, but 19 Analysts from important allies and potential peer competitors such as Russia have somewhat grudgingly agreed that while the attacks of September 11 th did not usher in a completely new era in international relations, the revealed scope of the security threat from terrorism was enough to shift almost all political trends among nations. 20 Operational level leaders have repeatedly said that we have just begun to cross the long plateau of struggle with terrorism and extremist ideology. 21 The military certainly considers itself to be serving a "Nation at war," stating that this campaign will not be short and plans for the future as such. 22 Many believe that this struggle is the "work of decades" and "closer to the beginning than to the end." 23 These analysts, practitioners and observers are all referring to a continual struggle with a robust role for the U.S. military.
Regardless of the controlling party in Congress or the person occupying the White House, confrontation with radical ideology and prevention of terrorist acts will continue to absorb a considerable amount of resources; no Administration will fail to make it clear to the American people that security of the homeland is his or her number one priority. Outside the borders of the United States, action will be required in territories in which a significant portion of the population is dissatisfied with their socioeconomic status, thereby allowing religious or other ideology to turn radical. Such action will probably not involve protracted conventional battle, yet the United State will be unable to disinterestedly watch while states that are susceptible to an infusion of radical ideology fall apart. At the high end of this spectrum another Iraq-type conflict is not unthinkable; at the low end, operations such as the humanitarian activities in the Horn of Africa are expected.
With regard to the temporal aspect of this "warm war", it is commonly believed that the American people have little patience for the twists and turns and mistakes that time will bring and that the omni-present media will display, and little stomach for the price exacted to do so. As discussed previously, they will expect precision, limited casualties, agility and a quick victory. 24 However, there are some indicators that the public may think differently about what they have been told is a "long war" and may have more tolerance for it than in previous eras.
The American people remember the pain caused by the terrorist attacks but no longer feel it. They horror has faded, not to be re-lived until another such attack happens. This is evidenced by the fact that just two months after September 11, 2001 , only 40% of the American people said that they were very or somewhat worried about terrorism. 25 But there is a difference between being "worried" about terrorism and thinking that combating it is an important national endeavor.
In a recent poll on political surveys, the war in Iraq topped the list of "most important problems facing the country," terrorism in general was a 10 th with all issues in between related to domestic or economic concerns. 26 However, when asked to rate "defending the country from future terrorist attacks" among the priorities for President
Bush and the Congress for this year, 74% of those polled said that it was a top priority and 22% said "important but lower" than top, second only to strengthening the nation's economy.
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This leads to a discussion of material salience. The percentage of U.S. GDP for this war is less than any other war in American history. The Korean War cost 11.7% of the GDP, Vietnam 8.9%, the Cold War 6.9%, the first Gulf War 4.6%, and this "war" approaching 4.5%. 28 Yet as the struggle has progressed over the last seven plus years, spending for it has gone up remarkably. In 2001, the GWOT bill was $14 billion, in 2003 it was $88 billion, and in 2007 it was $163 billion. 29 In relative terms, the means applied to achieve the ends is minimal. In absolute terms, material growth has been significant. The aspect of time and constant low-level fighting is marginally relevant to moral integration. This campaign is one of prevention and deterrence for the long term and is just as the term "campaign" implies -a series of operations and engagements that will keep the armed forces busy. If the conflict is prolonged, if it is important, and if it becomes part of day-to-day America, is it not natural that the people will come to expect the government and the military to take care of the threat quietly, as long as there is minimal impact on freedom of movement, individual liberties and the pursuit of economic prosperity? However, time does present the opportunity for revelation of more incidents that may demonstrate that the military does not always treat people with decency, such as the torture at Abu Graib, the perception that the death of Pat Tillman was covered up, and the neglect of wounded soldiers at Walter Reed. As the incidents accumulate, one could expect that the public will look with greater distrust at the military. In this regard the results are mixed. The latest Gallup poll found that 69% of the public had on confidence in the military as an institution, down from 83% in 2003. 32 However, recent polls suggest that society trusts this All-Volunteer Force three times a much as they trust the president and five times as much as they trust the Congress.
Relative to other government institutions, the military is doing well. Absolutely, the trend is downward.
With regard to the length of this conflict, it seems that society recognizes the important position of the military, yet will not write a blank check for a threat it does not actually feel. With regard to moral integration, time could very well exacerbate the suspicion with which the people like at military men and women. Overall, the gap might be widening slightly.
The second factor speaks to another unique aspect of the current campaign - democratic. There is no government institution that is less elitist and more diverse than the military. 40 Overall, the emotional or normative connection that the public feels to the individual members of the All-Volunteer Force is greater than it has been since World War II.
In sum with regard to the affect the All Volunteer Force, one could argue that while the public is content with relegating military service to a very small segment of the population, it is listening to the requirements expressed by the military and is supportive up to the point of a draft. Again relative to other times in U.S. history, the material presence of the military is less and the gap wider. But in absolute terms, it is manageable. The morale presence of the military as an All Volunteer Force is high.
Third, this long war is unique in that it is almost exclusively directed against actors who do not represent a government or a state. They will be radical ideologues of trans-national character or ethnic or tribal groups inside state boundaries. Combating and managing these actors will demand the use of non-traditional instruments of national power and non-traditional military tactics, and require unprecedented levels of civil-military cooperation. These operations, along the length of the spectrum of potential actions mentioned previously, are likely to involve the Interagency, as well as publicprivate partnerships.
The character of the almost fifteen year old debate that began in the peace operations decade of the 1990s has changed slightly with the struggle against ideological extremism. The UK's International Development Secretary Hilary Benn stated, "we do not use the phrase 'war on terror' because we can't win by military means alone …." 41 It is more flavored by police, non-defense intelligence, and civilian stability and development missions, but it still goes largely like this: the military is a blunt instrument for accomplishing tasks not directly related to engaging and destroying the enemy, but is the only agency in the U.S. federal government with access to sufficient manpower and other resources to address many of the tasks required to achieve the desired political endstate. The most robust and widely-accepted plan has been the one to create a threetiered system to move civilians, both federal and non into an operation quickly. 50 This is not a new phenomenon, and heretofore in the "long war" there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that it is approaching the level of WWII when an attempt was made to ensure civil-military cooperation in re-building post-Nazi Germany. 51 Additionally, because this struggle is likely to take place against non-state, transnational actors, the international community, particularly the U.S., has been redefining the rules of the game in terms of protection of individual rights, preservation of American values, and appropriate intelligence gathering. Where the military is involved, such as at detention facilities, in the debate on torture, and in the issuing of thousands of national security letters to gather domestic records, the public is watchful and wary. 52 To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even preemptive war. These are evils because each strays from national and international law and because they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process. They can be justified only because they prevent the greater evil. The question is not whether we should be trafficking in lesser evils but whether we can keep lesser evils under the control of free institutions. culture. 54 This particular characterization of the issue is not universally accepted, but the debate goes on and to the extent that the military becomes embroiled in it, the relationship of the military to society will likely be affected.
In sum, with regard to this third factor, it appears that there is no evidence for a civil-military material gap. Society provides resources to the military for the accomplishment of all types of missions. However, the moral presence of the military in society may be decreasing in this regard; note the preference society has for the types of military employment, the military's involvement in the infringement of civil liberties, and a sense that the military potentially feels itself superior to the civilians.
The fourth factor is the hardest to grapple with. The United States is prosecuting a campaign against enemies whose major tactic -terrorism -has the short term objective of reminding innocents of their cause through the disruption of day-to-day life.
The enemies who may most threaten the security of the United States have no immediate expectation or objective of toppling the U.S. government or any other democratic regime. Their aim is to cause turmoil, pain and even consistent inconvenience over an extended period of time, in order to achieve graduated goals in their own regions. As the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism says, "Extremists use terrorism -the purposeful targeting of ordinary people -to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious or ideological goals." 55 The uniqueness of terrorism is that terrorists achieve their goals not through the acts themselves but through the response to the acts. The consequences of the violence are merely the first steps toward more remote objectives and are aimed at psychological result. 56 The methods of the enemy demand a very different calculation of ends, ways and means.
For example, it is fairly well known that Al Q'aida wants the United States out of the Middle East and wants to establish Islamic states in that region. It is also well accepted that its general strategy is to provoke the United States into committing a level of ground forces into the region that will exhaust the public's will to stay in the fightand in the region. 57 The Administration is well aware of this and must walk a very fine line so as not to actually assist the enemy in prosecuting its strategy.
Terrorists can claim victory when their chosen adversary responds to their tactics meant to instill fear. Terrorists rarely seek change from those they target; rather, they want those watching to change policy, change the fundamental character of opposing societies, or otherwise concede to more immediate demands. In other words, to make the tactic ineffective, policy makers have to convince the public not to pay attention. If Al Q'aida can make life uncomfortable enough for the average American citizen, they may be able to obtain capitulation from the American government on certain policies.
Therefore, it stands to reason that "the GWOT is a war to preserve ordinary peoples' ability to live as they choose, and to protect the tolerance and moderation of free and open societies."
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In this struggle, is it really both impractical and immoral to tell the American people to live life as usual while asking the military to bear the burden of deadly overseas ventures alone? 59 Among many, Senator Lieberman says yes and has called for shared sacrifice, saying, "…our military went to war but our nation did not go to war.
And as long as that is true, we are not going to have the success and the victory we need." 60 Is he right?
The public cannot be accused of not wanting to sacrifice; it is merely doing what the President, the Commander in Chief asked of it. And maybe he is correct. Who has not had the passing thought that for each pair of shoes removed at the airport security screen, Al Q'aida has scored a small victory? Is it not possible that every dollar spent on the so-called GWOT is a dollar not spent on under-developed nations, arguably a necessary context within which trans-national terrorist organizations operate?
The character of the struggle because of the tactics used by the enemy, have demanded a military material presence much lower than many analysts instinctively and logically, believe it should be. We have only statements from the Administration as evidence that refusing a higher stage of mobilization, higher taxes, or greater spending as part of the GDP, is a matter of deliberate calculation, not a matter of an ignorant mismatch of ends, ways and means. The public has met the demands that the president has asked for as evidenced above. The fact that the public wants the military out of Iraq does not speak to its commitment to the larger campaign.
The public regularly reads terrorist plots were foiled. 61 Yet it does not live in fear of another attack. A sense of fear or urgency might well cause the people to willingly provide whatever resources are required to eliminate a threat. This is not known. As it is, the public will not wring its hands overmuch even about the expenditure of the most precious of resources -American lives -if a convincing argument is made that the end is worth the cost. In a recent survey, only 28% of adults were able to say that about 4,000 Americans have died in Iraq. 62 Unlike in Vietnam, the reason for the "GWOT" is not obscure and the price that the public is willing to pay has not yet risen above the value of the ends. 63 The fact that we do not know what price the public would be willing to pay may be a matter of Administration policy. The Administration has been accused of fear-mongering on one hand, and not doing enough on the other. It must maintain a state of equilibrium between not disrupting the economy and state of moral well-being of the public and trying to ensure the safety of the state.
In sum, looking at the four factors that are unique to this struggle, we see a material presence in society that is not as great as in conflicts past. We see a moral presence that is not significantly more removed from society than in times past, but is So There is a Gap….
What does this relative gap mean? Is it necessarily a problem? The difficulty in aligning ends, ways and means in this current struggle is exemplified by the recent poll that indicated that 44% of the American people -a record high since regular polling on this subject begin in 2001-felt that the U.S. military was not strong enough. However, an equal percent felt that the U.S. spent too much on defense. This reflects a belief that the government must secure the homeland against terrorist attacks, but at the same time not negatively affect quality of day to day life.
Changes in ways and means described above must be linked to the political end.
One can assume that the unspoken political objective of the fight against violent extremism is to minimize the damage that terrorists can inflict on America and her allies;
it would be futile to develop policy with the goal of eliminating the tactic of terrorism or even ideological extremism. This being the case, the ways and means used to achieve this goal must be tailored in ways that are unprecedented. How is the merit of this calculation determined? It is possible that the Clausewitzian concept of optimality may offer the answer. He said that the ideal strategy will accomplish the political objective at the lowest possible cost. It will manage the ways and means of a campaign to suit the political end, applying neither too little nor too much. 64 It follows then that the attempt to apply effort when it is counter to achieving the political objective is illogical. Demanding of the American people increased taxes, rationing, military draft and/or other forms of sacrifice, could potentially exhaust their will to fight this battle at all.
The ideal end of a balanced civil-military relationship is the protection of the American way of life. The common expression of the national ethos is "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," meaning that American citizens should have freedom of movement, protection of their individual liberties, and the right to pursue economic prosperity. How the U.S. government, and by extension, the U.S. military, has ensured these things has fluctuated over time. It may be that support for the political end of a military operation is not best obtained through a direct and personal stake of the American people, particularly when a certain pre-conceived stake is not necessary to achieve the ends.
It seems that the "GWOT" does in fact have the ability to cause a greater distance between that of the military and that of society in both material and moral terms. But it is not nearly as much as some would have observers think and more importantly, it will not necessarily amount to a decrease in effectiveness. Nothing contained herein should necessarily point the reader at an impending crisis in civilmilitary relations. The boundaries within which the military relates to civilian authorities are likely to remain quite narrow -and mostly appropriate. What this study does point to is a potential need to re-look the near-universally accepted construct by which military operation (ways), the resources used by the military to execute policy (means) and the political objective (ends) are joined. Moreover, it could provide the opportunity for greater effectiveness in the struggle against violent extremism.
Recommendations and Conclusion
First, policymakers should attempt to develop a grand strategy for addressing the threat environment of the 21 st Century. Terrorism, energy security and non-proliferation are the largest threats. A strategy that matches means to ways to ends will help to rationalize what seems to be a mismatch in the "GWOT." Context and a coherent approach will help the United States to avoid using confusing rhetoric. Words matter and positing that violent extremists pose an "existential threat" to America and
Americans cannot help but to arouse some bewilderment. 65 If our very existence is threatened, the public will expect to make a sacrifice. Our existence is not threatened at this time, but the potential for extreme harm in the future is something the U.S. must combat indefinitely, particularly with regard to the nexus of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The fact that our existence is not threatened does not mean that military men and women will not be asked to give their lives in pursuit of viable policy. That policy should be clear. John F. Kennedy began the Peace Corps in 1960 in order to demonstrate American good will around the globe and to encourage national service. 69 Perhaps it is time to relook the idea of compulsory national service. Traditionally, military conscription has worked when "the cause was just, the stakes high and the burden equitable." 70 The cause is just, the stakes are high enough, and the burden could be made more 
